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During August 2015, a boil water notice (BWN) was 
issued across parts of North West England following 
the detection of Cryptosporidium oocysts in the pub-
lic water supply. Using prospective syndromic surveil-
lance, we detected statistically significant increases 
in the presentation of cases of gastroenteritis and 
diarrhoea to general practitioner services and related 
calls to the national health telephone advice service in 
those areas affected by the BWN. In the affected areas, 
average in-hours general practitioner consultations 
for gastroenteritis increased by 24.8% (from 13.49 
to 16.84) during the BWN period; average diarrhoea 
consultations increased by 28.5% (from 8.33 to 10.71). 
Local public health investigations revealed no labo-
ratory reported cases confirmed as being associated 
with the water supply. These findings suggest that the 
increases reported by syndromic surveillance of cases 
of gastroenteritis and diarrhoea likely resulted from 
changes in healthcare seeking behaviour driven by 
the intense local and national media coverage of the 
potential health risks during the event. This study has 
further highlighted the potential for media-driven bias 
in syndromic surveillance, and the challenges in dis-
entangling true increases in community infection from 
those driven by media reporting.
Introduction
Since its first identification as a cause of human infec-
tion, the protozoan parasite Cryptosporidium has been 
established as a significant cause of morbidity and 
mortality globally [1]. Over 20 different Cryptosporidium 
species have been recognised, with 15 currently 
reported to cause human infection. However the major-
ity of human infections are associated with infection 
from Cryptosporidium hominis and Cryptosporidium 
parvum [2]. Cryptosporidiosis is particularly associated 
with prolonged and persistent diarrhoea, however it is 
also characterised by abdominal pain, nausea and/or 
vomiting [3,4]. Transmission is through the faecal–oral 
route; symptoms generally occur between 2 to 12 days 
post infection with a mean incubation period of 5 to 7 
days. The burden of Cryptosporidium is greater in chil-
dren and those who are malnourished or immunocom-
promised [5,6].
In high income countries, Cryptosporidium is a lead-
ing cause of waterborne outbreaks. One of the largest 
and best described outbreaks occurred in Milwaukee 
(Wisconsin, United States) during 1993, where over 
400,000 people using a municipal water supply were 
affected during a two month period [7]. In England, rec-
reational water Cryptosporidium outbreaks, e.g. asso-
ciated with swimming pools, are far more common than 
those involving public drinking water supplies [8]. Four 
previous drinking water outbreaks have been described 
in England, including the largest in the East Midlands 
where contamination of the local water supply resulted 
in an estimated 400 excess cases of diarrhoea and 23 
laboratory-confirmed cases [9]. As the detection of 
oocysts in water samples can indicate a potential risk 
to health, the water supplier may decide to issue a boil 
water notice (BWN), advising the affected populations 
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to boil all water before drinking [10]. In previous stud-
ies evaluating the public’s understanding and compli-
ance with BWNs, varying levels of compliance during 
the notice period were revealed [11-15]. In England the 
decision to lift a BWN is taken by the water supplier, in 
consultation with public health organisations.
In England, during any incident where Cryptosporidium 
oocysts have been detected in a public water supply, a 
number of different public health surveillance systems, 
including laboratory reporting and syndromic surveil-
lance, are used to identify the impact, if any, on dis-
ease burden. Syndromic surveillance can be used both 
to assess increases in the healthcare consultations e.g. 
to primary care, and to reassure lack of impact where 
there are no changes detected in healthcare seeking 
behaviour.
Between 31 July and 4 August 2015 Cryptosporidium 
oocysts were identified in a water treatment works 
supplying drinking water to parts of the North West 
England region. As a result a BWN was issued on 6 
August 2015 in the areas concerned. We describe the 
use of syndromic surveillance to monitor healthcare 
seeking behaviour in those areas affected, to determine 
whether increases in the presentation of gastroenteri-
tis symptoms were linked to the alert.
Cryptosporidium alert
Routine testing of water supplies at Franklaw water 
treatment works (which supplied drinking water 
to the affected areas), detected low numbers of 
Cryptosporidium oocysts between 31 July and 4 August 
2015 (initial sample results of 0.031 and 0.119 oocysts 
per 10 L water were well below 0.2 oocysts per 10 L, the 
‘trigger’ level where measures such as flushing the 
water network or closing the plant become necessary). 
A BWN was issued on 6 August across Lancashire and 
Blackpool upper tier local authorities (LAs: across 
England local government functions are divided 
between two tiers of local authority, upper and lower 
tier local authority), affecting ca 300,000 households 
and attracting local media coverage (Figure 1). Water 
samples taken across the affected water network 
remained positive for Cryptosporidium over the next 
few weeks, albeit below the ‘trigger’ level. To clear the 
system of Cryptosporidium, the water authority adopted 
a combination of flushing the water network, transfer-
ring water from other parts of the network and install-
ing ultraviolet light rigs. It was decided that before the 
Figure 1
Location of Blackpool and Lancashire upper tier local authorities (LAs) as well as the postcode districts in these two LAs, 
which were affected by a boil water notice, North West England, 6 August−6 September 2015
A. B. 
Cumbria
Lancashire
Blackpool
Blackburn
(A) The area of the North West England region, covered by the Cumbria and Lancashire Public Health England (PHE) team (which includes 
Blackburn, Blackpool, Cumbria and Lancashire LAs), is coloured in different tones of blue. Within this area, Blackpool and Lancashire LAs, 
which were affected by the boil water notice are in darker blue. The location of the affected water treatment works is illustrated by a red 
circle.
(B) Postcode districts affected by the boil water notice within Blackpool and Lancashire LAs are shaded.
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BWN could be lifted in any given part of the network 
supplied by the Franklaw water plant, water sampling 
should be negative on three consecutive days. Across 
various parts of the network, as negative samples were 
identified, the BWN was lifted: on 27 August the BWN 
was partially lifted across parts of Blackpool; over the 
next 10 days the BWN was gradually lifted across fur-
ther areas, until 6 September, when the BWN was lifted 
across the whole water network. The routine local pub-
lic health investigation revealed that there were no lab-
oratory reported cases which could be confirmed to be 
associated with the water supply either before, during 
or after the BWN (data now shown).
Methods
Syndromic surveillance
Syndromic surveillance is the near real-time collection, 
analysis, interpretation and dissemination of health-
related data to enable the early identification of the 
impact (or absence of impact) of potential human or 
veterinary public-health threats which require effective 
public health action [16]. The Public Health England 
(PHE) Real-time Syndromic Surveillance Team (ReSST) 
coordinates a suite of national syndromic surveillance 
systems and delivers a real-time syndromic surveillance 
service that has been described in detail elsewhere 
[17]. In brief, daily data are collected from a number of 
healthcare provider sources and analysed, interpreted 
and risk assessed using statistical algorithms (model-
ling historical data to identify significant increases in 
activity) [18]. The data received are aggregated into a 
number of syndromic indicators based upon symptoms 
and clinical diagnosis of disease.
For this incident, telehealth (National Health Service 
(NHS) telephone advice, NHS 111) calls, general prac-
titioner (GP) in-hours (GP IH) and GP out-of-hours (GP 
OOH) syndromic surveillance data for gastroenteritis, 
diarrhoea and vomiting were used. NHS 111 calls were 
based upon such symptoms reported by patients, 
while GP consultations included those where the clini-
cal diagnosis made by the GP involved clinical codes 
relating to gastroenteritis, diarrhoea or vomiting. The 
population coverage of each system in the LAs issued 
with the BWN and those neighbouring the BWN area 
was initially assessed to ensure that there was suf-
ficient surveillance coverage: GP OOH coverage in 
Blackburn LA (which neighboured the LAs with the 
BWN) was insufficient for surveillance and, therefore, 
was not included in the results.
Epidemiological analysis
NHS 111 telephone calls, GP IH and GP OOH syndro-
mic surveillance data were monitored during the 
period of the BWN (6 August to 5 September) and for 
14 days after. Daily data counts were plotted as rates 
per 100,000 population (GP IH) and per cent of indica-
tor to total calls/consultations (NHS 111/GP OOH) with 
3 day moving averages included to aid interpretation. 
Data were analysed by LA, including two which were 
affected by the BWN (Blackpool LA and Lancashire LA) 
and two neighbouring LAs not affected by the BWN 
(Blackburn LA and Cumbria LA). Data were also ana-
lysed for the Cumbria and Lancashire PHE local health 
protection team area [19], which included a footprint 
covering all four LAs (Figure 1).
Statistical analysis
Routine statistical analysis of syndromic surveillance 
data was undertaken prospectively on a daily basis 
during the study period using automated statistical 
models to identify significant exceedances compared 
with either recent activity, or historically expected lev-
els. The routine statistical methods used are described 
in detail elsewhere however in summary a baseline 
was estimated for each system and syndromic indica-
tor using a multi-level hierarchical mixed effects model 
incorporating appropriate variables (e.g. day of the 
week and public holidays) [18]. An upper 99% prediction 
interval threshold for expected activity each day was 
established using the estimated baselines, adjusting 
for variation in the total volume of daily data received. 
Exceedances were assessed as significant where the 
actual number of consultations or calls exceeded these 
99% prediction interval thresholds [18].
A Student’s two-tailed test was used to determine 
differences in the mean syndromic surveillance daily 
data during the BWN (6 August to 5 September) and 
a comparative period of 31 days (2 July to 1 August; 
the same sequence and number of days as the BWN 
were included) preceding the BWN (‘non-BWN’ period). 
Weekends (when GP IH services are closed) were 
removed from the analysis of GP IH data resulting in 
comparative periods of 21 days. A mean of the daily 
syndromic surveillance data was taken for each geo-
graphical location and syndromic indicator separately, 
for the period of the BWN. Results for Blackpool and 
Lancashire LAs were compared with two neighbouring 
LAs not issued with the BWN (Blackburn and Cumbria 
LAs), Cumbria and Lancashire PHE team area, as well 
as England.
All statistical analyses were undertaken using Stata 
v13 [20].
Results
Epidemiological analysis
There was an apparent increase in GP consultations 
for gastroenteritis during the period of the BWN in the 
two affected LAs. GP OOH consultations increased 
immediately following the issue of the BWN, with the 
highest peak occurring in Lancashire LA. The peak in 
GP IH consultations occurred a few days later (follow-
ing a weekend), and peaked highest in Blackpool LA 
(Figure 2). The increases in the two affected LAs were 
reflected at the level of the PHE team area of Cumbria 
and Lancashire, where GP IH consultation rates for gas-
troenteritis remained at slightly elevated levels for the 
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duration of the BWN, before subsequently returning to 
expected levels.
GP OOH consultations for diarrhoea increased immedi-
ately following the BWN, and peaked before GP IH diar-
rhoea consultations; Lancashire LA peaked highest in 
the GP OOH and Blackpool LA in the GP IH (Figure 3). 
NHS 111 calls for diarrhoea peaked concurrently with 
GP OOH and peaked highest in Blackpool LA. GP IH 
consultation rates for diarrhoea remained at elevated 
levels for the duration of the BWN, before returning to 
expected levels once the BWN was lifted.
GP IH consultations for vomiting showed a similar 
increase during the BWN period however this was only 
noted in Blackpool LA. There were no increases in vom-
iting presentations in the GP OOH or NHS 111 systems 
(Figure 4).
Routine statistical analysis
Routine statistical analysis of the data received by 
ReSST on a daily basis illustrated significant increases 
in the gastroenteritis and diarrhoea indicators at the 
LA level, occurring on the day of, and immediately fol-
lowing the issue of the BWN (Table 1). The frequency 
of the statistically significant alarms decreased after 9 
August, after which few alarms occurred.
Comparing syndromic surveillance data between the 
BWN (6 August – 5 September) and non-BWN (2 July 
– 1 August) periods revealed significant differences in 
those areas where the BWN had been issued (Table 2). 
Within Blackpool and Lancashire LAs GP IH gastroen-
teritis and diarrhoea mean consultation rates were sig-
nificantly higher during the BWN (p < 0.01). Considering 
these two LAs together, the gastroenteritis GP IH aver-
age consultation rates during the BWN increased by 
Figure 2
Daily presentation (3 day moving average) of gastroenteritis consultations to general practitioner services (in-hours and out-
of-hours) in North West England, 7 July−26 September 2015
Data presented for England (dark green), Cumbria and Lancashire Public Health England (PHE) team area (brown) and for upper tier local 
authorities (LAs) within this team area (Blackburn, light blue; Blackpool, light green; Cumbria, light orange and Lancashire, purple).
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24.8% (i.e. from 13.49 to 16.84), while average diar-
rhoea consultations increased by 28.5% (8.33 to 10.71). 
In Blackpool LA, GP IH rates for gastroenteritis and 
diarrhoea were 33.5% and 35.4% higher during the 
BWN period while in Lancashire LA these were 15.2% 
and 20.8% higher. In the two neighbouring LAs not 
affected by the BWN, there were no significant differ-
ences observed at the 95% or 99% significance levels. 
At the PHE team area level (Cumbria and Lancashire), 
there were significant increases (p < 0.01) in gastroen-
teritis or diarrhoea across all systems. There were also 
significant results at the National (England) level, how-
ever these results were significant indicating higher 
incidence during the non-BWN period for selected indi-
cators in the GP IH and NHS 111 systems. When com-
paring vomiting indicators across each system there 
were no significant differences between the BWN and 
non-BWN periods.
Discussion
We present a description of the real-time monitor-
ing of healthcare seeking behaviour using syndromic 
surveillance during a BWN following the detection of 
Cryptosporidium in the mains water supply to parts of 
North West England between 31 July and 4 August 2015. 
The BWN impacted on a large number of people (ca 
Figure 3
Daily presentation (3 day moving average) of diarrhoea general practitioner (GP) consultations and National Health Service 
(NHS) 111 calls in North West England, 7 July−26 September 2015
Data presented for England (dark green), Cumbria and Lancashire Public Health England (PHE) team area (brown) and for upper tier local 
authorities (LAs) within this team area (Blackburn, light blue; Blackpool, light green; Cumbria, light orange and Lancashire, purple).
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300,000 households) in Blackpool and Lancashire LAs. 
Routine syndromic surveillance revealed significant 
increases in presentations to GPs (GP IH and GP OOH) 
and NHS 111 calls for diarrhoea and gastroenteritis in 
Blackpool and Lancashire LAs in the days immediately 
following the BWN. Rates of these indicators remained 
elevated for several days before returning to expected 
seasonal levels. There were no significant increases 
in neighbouring LAs where water supplies were unaf-
fected. Interestingly, Lancashire LA was large in terms 
of geographical area (cf.d with Blackpool LA) however 
only certain areas of it were actually impacted by the 
BWN (Figure 1). This implied that the local impact in 
those areas affected was higher than that estimated 
for the LA as a whole.
Increases in GP OOH and NHS 111 indicators were 
observed immediately following the BWN whereas GP 
IH indicators peaked over the following days. The BWN 
was issued on a Thursday afternoon, meaning patients 
had more opportunity to access out of hours healthcare 
services, resulting in immediate increases compared 
with the routine GP services which patients were better 
able to access in the following week. This emphasises 
the importance of accessing syndromic surveillance 
data from a range of healthcare services, or those that 
Figure 4
Daily presentation (3 day moving average) of vomiting general practitioner (GP) consultations and National Health Service 
(NHS) 111 calls in North West England, 7 July−26 September 2015
Data presented for England (dark green), Cumbria and Lancashire Public Health England (PHE) team area (brown) and for upper tier local 
authorities (LAs) within this team area (Blackburn, light blue; Blackpool, light green; Cumbria, light orange and Lancashire, purple).
7www.eurosurveillance.org
Table 1
Routine analyses resulting in statistical alarms for syndromic surveillance systems in Blackpool and Lancashire upper tier 
local authorities (LA), the two LAs affected by the boil water notice, North West England, 1 August−16 September 2015
System
Diarrhoea Gastroenteritis Vomiting
Blackpool Lancashire Blackpool Lancashire Blackpool Lancashire
NHS 
111
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
NHS 
111
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
NHS 
111
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
NHS 
111
GP 
IH
GP 
OOH
01/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
02/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
03/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
04/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
05/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
06/8/15a Y N N Y N Y N N N Y N N N N N N
07/8/15 N Y N Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y
08/8/15 Y NA Y Y NA Y NA Y NA Y N NA N N NA Y
09/8/15 N NA Y Y NA Y NA Y NA Y N NA Y N NA Y
10/8/15 N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N N
11/8/15 N N Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N
12/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
13/8/15 N Y N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N
14/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
15/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
16/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA Y N NA N N NA N
17/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
18/8/15 N N Y N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N
19/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
20/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N
21/8/15 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N
22/8/15 N NA N N NA N N N NA N N NA N N NA N
23/8/15 N NA N N NA N N N NA N N NA N N NA N
24/8/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
25/8/15 N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N
26/8/15 Y N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N
27/8/15b N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
28/8/15 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N
29/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
30/8/15 N NA Y N NA N NA Y NA N N NA N N NA Y
31/8/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
01/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
02/9/15 N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N
03/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
04/9/15 N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N
05/9/15 N NA N Y NA N NA N NA Y N NA N N NA N
06/9/15c N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N N NA N
07/9/15 N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N
08/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
09/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
10/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
11/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
12/9/15 N NA N N NA N NA N NA N N NA N Y NA Y
13/9/15 N NA N N NA N NA Y NA N N NA N N NA N
14/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
15/9/15 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y
16/9/15 Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
GP IH: general practitioner in-hours system; GP OOH: general practitioner out-of-hours system; N: no statistically significant exceedance recorded; NA: not 
applicable (GP IH services not routinely available at weekends); NHS: National Health Service; Y: statistically significant exceedance recorded.
Dates are represented as day/month/year. Daily data are routinely collected from a number of healthcare provider sources and analysed, interpreted and 
risk assessed using automated statistical models (modelling historical data to identify significant increases in activity) [18]. Cells representing days with a 
statistically significant exceedance are highlighted in yellow. The issue and the partial or complete lifting of the boil water notice are indicated by dark blue 
shading. Weekends and public holidays are shaded in light blue. 
a Boil water notice. 
b Partial lifting of boil water notice. 
c Complete lifting of boil water notice across remaining areas.
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are immediately available to the population, to accu-
rately determine the peak of impact of an event.
As part of the local routine incident response, there 
were small increases in laboratory detections of 
Cryptosporidium identified from patient samples in 
Blackpool LA (data not available from other affected 
LAs) during week 35 (25–31 August 2015). In the 
affected area, laboratory reports increased from an 
average of one detection per week in the four preced-
ing weeks to seven during week 35 and 12 during week 
36, then falling to expected levels over the following 
two weeks. However, this coincided with a national 
increase of Cryptosporidium infection across England 
(peaking nationally week 37, 7–13 September 2015): 
there was also insufficient information to link individ-
ual cases within BWN areas to the local water supply, 
or there were other risk factors (e.g. history of travel) 
involved (data not shown). This, linked to the original 
low oocyst count in water samples suggested that it 
was highly likely that the increase in healthcare seek-
ing behaviour monitored by syndromic surveillance 
during the BWN was due to intense local and national 
media reporting, rather than actual Cryptosporidium 
infections.
Local populations were informed of the BWN through 
printed and digital media and advised to seek medical 
advice if they had symptoms of cryptosporidiosis such 
as diarrhoea, including consulting a GP in order that 
faecal samples could be collected and tested to con-
firm Cryptosporidium infection. It is possible that this 
messaging therefore had several impacts: (i) sympto-
matic patients who would not normally have consulted 
a healthcare professional (i.e. they would have self-
treated at home) would have been more likely to visit 
one of these services; (ii) the volume of tests requested 
would have increased possibly increasing the overall 
number of positive tests; (iii) healthcare profession-
als might have been more likely to notify cases or use 
Table 2
Means of rates of general practitioner (GP) in-hours consultation, and percentages of GP out-of-hours consultations and 
National Health Service (NHS) 111 calls for gastroenteritis, diarrhoea and vomiting during the boil water notice and non-
boil water notice periods, and comparison of the two periods, North West England, July−September 2015
System Indicator and periodMeanb
Blackpool LA Lancashire LA Blackburn LA Cumbria LA Cumbria and Lancashirea England
P 
value Mean
b P 
value Mean
b P 
value Mean
b P 
value Mean
b P 
value Mean
b P 
value
GP IH
Gastroenteritis
BWN 18.954
0.009 
14.728
0.001 
12.545
0.103
14
0.098
14.68
0.005 
12.069
0.002Non-
BWN 14.2 12.786 14.401 15.240 13.526 12.732
Diarrhoea
BWN 11.951
0.003 
9.462
0.000 
6.931
0.449
9.786
0.107
9.472
0.001 
7.424
0.17Non-
BWN 8.829 7.835 6.331 10.825 8.375 7.553
Vomiting
BWN 5.258
0.036
3.823
0.328
3.939
0.789
3.719
0.384
3.914
0.286
2.856
0.000Non-
BWN 3.754 3.642 4.069 3.983 3.758 3.289
GP 
OOH
Gastroenteritis
BWN 3.531
0.005 
4.343
0.000 
NA
NA
3.157
0.142
3.839
0.001 
4.165
0.457Non-
BWN 2.586 3.245 NA 3.531 3.185 4.213
Diarrhoea
BWN 1.035
0.156
1.399
0.004 
NA
NA
0.905
0.565
1.176
0.011
1.151
0.154Non-
BWN 0.767 0.974 NA 0.982 0.943 1.101
Vomiting
BWN 0.922
0.08
1.090
0.891
NA
NA
1.083
0.178
1.06
0.903
1.418
0.136Non-
BWN 0.658 1.079 NA 1.277 1.052 1.460
NHS 
111
Diarrhoea
BWN 3.647
0.002 
2.626
0.000 
2.487
0.946
1.883
0.05
2.695
0.000 
2.068
0.046Non-
BWN 2.126 1.627 2.462 3.338 1.864 2.154
Vomiting
BWN 2.897
0.68
2.453
0.394
2.756
0.059
2.058
0.121
2.509
0.018
2.738
0.000Non-
BWN 3.034 2.596 3.767 3.008 2.817 2.966
BWN: boil water notice period (6/8/15–8/9/15); GP IH: general practitioner in-hours system; GP OOH: general practitioner out-of-hours system; 
LA: local authority; NA: not applicable (GP OOH coverage in Blackburn LA was insufficient for surveillance and therefore not included in the 
results); non-BWN: non-boil water notice period (2/7/15–1/8/15). 
P-values significant at the 99% level are highlighted bold where mean values were higher during the BWN period.
a This refers to the Cumbria and Lancashire Public Health England area, which includes Blackburn, Blackpool, Cumbria and Lancashire LAs.
b Mean of GP IH consultation rate, or GP OOH consultation percentage, or NHS 111 call percentage.
9www.eurosurveillance.org
more specific clinical codes relevant to infectious gas-
troenteritis based upon the knowledge of the BWN and 
the health implications. Other sources of data from the 
incident (data not shown) illustrated an increase in the 
volume of tests, where the average number of weekly 
laboratory tests for Cryptosporidium increased from an 
average of 155 per week in the four preceding weeks 
to 264 in both weeks 33 and 34 (10–23 August 2015), 
respectively, during the BWN period. However, during 
this peak in testing, positivity rates remained low sug-
gesting that the excess tests were predominantly nega-
tive for Cryptosporidium during these two weeks (data 
not shown). The overall impact of this media messag-
ing therefore appeared to have been a period of over-
reporting likely including patients symptomatic for 
reasons unrelated to the BWN, who would not normally 
have sought advice from a healthcare service.
The impact of media coverage as a source of poten-
tial bias in syndromic surveillance has been reported 
infrequently. The nature of syndromic surveillance data 
collection renders these systems susceptible to shifts 
in healthcare seeking behaviour as a result of media 
coverage around a particular public health incident. We 
have previously reported the impact of media report-
ing on mumps clinician notifications illustrating poten-
tial bias in the public and health professionals [21]. 
The 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic also generated 
intense media coverage and retrospective analysis of 
regional news coverage was suggested to influence the 
demand for local microbiological testing of samples 
for influenza A(H1N1) [22]. Conversely, media report-
ing can also be used as a useful source of information, 
including news outlets, discussion sites and disease 
reporting networks, to provide additional intelligence 
and increased awareness of public health issues, thus 
augmenting existing public health surveillance pro-
grammes [23].
In the context of the period of the BWN described here, 
understanding the surveillance data was critical to 
avoid misinterpretation and thus giving out inaccurate 
messages to healthcare professionals and the public. 
Considering the incubation period of cryptosporidi-
osis and the possible exposure of the population to 
the organism, the timing of the observed increases in 
syndromic indicators suggested a plausible increase in 
infections. The predominance of increases in diarrhoea 
and gastroenteritis indicators, and not of vomiting, 
was again in line with understood symptom presenta-
tion of cryptosporidiosis [3,4]. However, close working 
with front line local public health teams was important 
as this enabled all public health intelligence e.g. labo-
ratory reporting to be included into the interpretation 
of syndromic data.
This paper highlights the real challenges and limita-
tions of using symptom-based data for the identifica-
tion of publicised outbreaks. We have shown an impact 
on health service providers in those areas affected 
by a BWN. This does not necessarily imply that there 
was an increase in the overall burden of gastroenteri-
tis and diarrhoea in the community, just a change in 
healthcare seeking behaviour and therefore those 
cases registered by a medical practitioner. However, 
this represents an important message: during this 
event, despite the lack of confirmed cases there was 
a similar increase in the presentation of patients to 
health services, placing additional pressure on GPs, 
NHS 111, laboratories and possibly pharmacies for 
over-the-counter remedies. These increases were all 
likely resulting from the reporting of the possible pub-
lic health risks through the media and resulted in a 
similar burden to some of these services as might be 
expected for a genuine incident. For future events, fur-
ther work might need to focus on improved messaging 
from public health authorities. These messages need 
to balance the reassurance for patients that the public 
health interventions applied e.g. a BWN have reduced 
the risk of exposure to any potential hazards while also 
ensuring that exposed cases are identified. They also 
additionally need to alert local health service provid-
ers of the potential for increased burden during these 
periods.
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